Disunion follows the Civil War as it unfolded.
After two days of indecisive conflict, the Union Army sealed its victory at Gettysburg on July 3, 1863, by repulsing a Confederate attack over nearly a mile of open ground, directed at the center of the federal defense. The attack involved 13,000 soldiers from five states under the command of Gen. James Longstreet, but lives historically as Pickett's Charge. The attack is one of the most infamous in military history, yet most people know little about it. What happened, exactly, on that afternoon in July?
Much of it hangs neither on Gen. George Pickett nor Longstreet, but Gen. Robert E. Lee, whose perspective this article examines. As the Army of Northern Virginia began its Pennsylvania invasion a month before, the sands of the Confederacy were draining low in triumph. Lee had gained no lasting advantage by successively defeating four Union commanders in Virginia during the preceding 11 months. His enemy simply reorganized north of the Rappahannock River, designated a new commander, and replenished losses before renewing relentless pressure on the outnumbered rebels. Meanwhile, in Mississippi, Ulysses S. Grant held Vicksburg in a death grip while Southern resources steadily diminished everywhere.
Consequently, Lee believed that the best chance for Confederate independence was to win the war quickly. Despite Union success in the West, public and diplomatic interest focused on the East. If Lee could draw the federal Army of the Potomac, recently defeated at Chancellorsville, into Pennsylvania and decisively beat it again in a series of hammer blows, Northern public support for the war might collapse. As one Massachusetts solider wrote home after the Union victory, "If the battle had gone against us, I should have made straight for [home] and … had lots of company."
In a private meeting with Gen. Isaac Trimble the week before Gettysburg, Lee presciently explained how he hoped to sequentially wreck the seven corps of the federal Army:
Our army is in good spirits … and can be concentrated … in twenty-four hours … When [the enemy] hear where we are they will make forced marches to interpose … between us and Baltimore and Philadelphia. They will come up … strung out in a long line much demoralized when they come into Pennsylvania. I shall throw an overwhelming force on their advance, crush it … drive one corps back on another and by successive [blows] … create a panic and virtually destroy their army.
The first of Gettysburg's three days almost perfectly conformed to Lee's hopes. Only the Union's First and 11th corps opposed him. Both were routed, suffering almost 50 percent casualty rates, including thousands who surrendered.
At the end of the second day, Lee knew he had also smashed the ill-placed federal Third corps and could believe that he had badly damaged the Second and Fifth. Only the Sixth was intact, but Lee could not be certain it had even arrived, or would be available on the third day.
Slide Show
The Battle of Gettysburg
It was the largest and bloodiest confrontation between Union and Confederate soldiers in the American Civil War.
Lee had three choices that day: remain in place, retreat or attack. He could remain idle only briefly because the federals were sure to be reinforced while the Confederates could not, thereby lengthening the odds against him. A retreat would forfeit victory to the federals and require a return to the weakening defensive status in Virginia. The only real choice was to attack, the only question how. The final answer was Pickett's Charge.
The charge was not the only option discussed by Lee and his generals, or even Lee's first choice. His second in command, Longstreet, wanted to maneuver around the south end of the Union Army and assume a defensive position or attack. But such a maneuver was risky: it would invite Union general George Meade to attack the rebel army by the flank while it was in march formation and likely destroy it.
Instead, Lee initially settled on a plan to simultaneously assault the federal fishhook-shaped defense from two directions. One would be from the northeast, to seize the Baltimore Pike behind Yankee lines. The second would attack the fishhook shank and capture the Taneytown Road. If successful, Meade's army would be split into three components, with rebels blocking the best escape and reinforcement routes. Temporarily successful attacks on both sectors the previous day indicated that a harder push on the 3rd could succeed.
Unfortunately, the Federal 12th Corps took the initiative at dawn on the third day, attacking the Confederates along the northeast perimeter. Since Lee's arrangements to attack the fishhook shank were not yet completed, his own plans for a two-pronged assault had been pre-empted. Although he could hope that his forces on the northeast might still defeat the 12th Corps, he couldn't assume such an outcome. He could either give up and return to Virginia, or develop a new plan.
Like all Civil War generals, Lee appreciated that frontal assaults, like the one he was contemplating that morning, were rarely successful. However, two months earlier, at Chancellorsville, he defeated this exact same army with a combination of vigorous assaults when his command was only half as big as the enemy's. His men were in high spirits, and he concluded it was a calculated risk that offered a prize worth the gamble. If the attack was preceded by a skilled artillery bombardment and accompanied by advancing batteries, as at Chancellorsville, it might succeed.
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The rebel barrage from 163 guns began about 1 p.m. Unfortunately, faulty fuses, a gradual tendency to shoot high after repeated recoils, and obscuring black powder smoke rendered the 90-minute cannonade less effective than hoped. Since an administrative error removed the reserve ammunition to a rear position, Gen. Edward Porter Alexander, who oversaw the artillery, couldn't effectively move forward to protect the advancing infantry.
The failed artillery bombardment doomed Picket's Charge to futile glory. Although Meade had drained troops from his center to strengthen his flanks, as Lee hoped, the Union was still able to meet the Confederate charge with 13,000 soldiers. In contrast, the original 13,000 attacking Confederates were depleted by artillery fire as they marched over nearly a mile of open ground. About 40 guns each from the north and south end of the federal line smothered the rebels in a deadly cross-fire. One Northerner characterized the situation as an "artillerist's dream and infantryman's nightmare." Upon reaching the Emmitsburg Road, the Confederates met canister fire, which results when artillery is loaded with shrapnel-packed shells, transforming them into giant shotguns. One Michigan soldier wrote, "I never saw such [canister] slaughter." At the high-water mark, where the Union line was pierced for 10 minutes, only about 2,500 rebels were left to make the final charge. The rest were retreating, captured or casualties. Officer losses were so numerous that none were left to order retreat.
Lee rode out to meet the survivors, repeatedly accepting blame without trying to shift any to someone else. "It is all my fault," he said again and again. In response to a despondent general Lee said, "Never mind, General all this has been my fault – it is I that have lost this fight, and you must help me out of it in the best way you can." He remained consistent a month later when he absolved the army in a letter to the Confederate president, Jefferson Davis, "I alone am to blame in perhaps expecting too much of its prowess and valor."
Despite his gloom, Lee presciently recognized that the Gettysburg carnage left Meade cautious despite his victory. If Gettysburg didn't result in a Confederate victory Lee predicted there would be no major federal offensive in Virginia for the rest of the year. Except for a modest Union effort late in November, he was correct. Thus, two months later he was able to dispatch General Longstreet's entire corps to Georgia where it contributed to the Confederate victory at Chickamauga.
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Sources: Gabor Boritt, "Ken Burns' Civil War," Pennsylvania History July 1991; Glenn Tucker, "High Tide at Gettysburg" and "Chickamauga"; Steven Woodworth, "Davis and Lee at War"; George Stewart, "Pickett's Charge"; Stephen Sears, "Gettysburg" and "Chancellorsville"; Isaac Trimble, "The Battle and Campaign of Gettysburg", Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 26, 1898; Shelby Foote, "Stars in Their Courses"; Jeffry D. Wert, "General James Longstreet"; Clifford Dowdey, "Death of a Nation"; Robert E. Lee, "The Wartime Papers of Robert E. Lee"; Douglas Freeman, "Robert E. Lee," Vol 3.
Phil Leigh is an armchair Civil War enthusiast and president of a market research company. He is the author of "Co. Aytch: Illustrated and Annotated," an illustrated and annotated version of the memoirs of Confederate Pvt. Sam Watkins.
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